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Administrative Judges' Role in Developing Social
Policy
CharlesKoch, Jr.*
Administrative judges have a serious, in some sense
dysfunctional, inferiority complex.' This leads them to be hypersensitive regarding their status vis-A-vis "real" judges. Yet their
role in society may eclipse that of other judges. While their worth
is often measured by cost effectiveness, their most significant
contribution is in the evolution of social policy. 2 Indeed, given the

growth of the administrative state, they have become crucial to
policy development. As the great sage of the administrative
process, James Landis, observed: "The ultimate test of the
administrative [institution] is the policy that it formulates; not the
fairness as between the parties of3 the disposition of a controversy
on a record of their own making."

Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Dudley W. Woolbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of
Law. B.A. University of Maryland, 1966; J.D. George Washington University,
1969; LL.M. University of Chicago, 1975. I would like to thank the LSU Law
Review and particularly those who organized this symposium.
Special
recognition goes to Professor Edward Richards for conceiving a symposium that
not only focuses on state administrative law but also on practical administrative
law topics. I can only hope he has launched a trend in both regards.
1. Officials who preside over administrative hearings are given many
names. Practice has settled on "administrative law judge," almost always
"ALJ." An acronym, although perhaps instinctive for administrative systems,
demeans them. Thus I use the general term "administrative judge." It
emphasizes that they are, no matter the label, judges and no less so because they
usually preside over specially tailored hearings. Certainly they are every bit as
much judges as family or traffic court judges. Their constitutional status is
equal to that of bankruptcy or immigration judges.
2. The term "policy" encompasses a wide variety of decisions that advance
or protect some collective goal of the community as a whole (as opposed to
those decisions that respect or secure some individual or group right). See 1
*

CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 1.2[2](d) (2d ed.
1997); HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 141 (William Eskridge & Philip
Frickey eds., 1994) ("A policy is simply a statement of objectives."); Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1975), reprinted in
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 4 (1977).
3. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 39 (1938).
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It is well established that administrative agencies, like common
law courts, may evolve policy through adjudication.4 Despite this
well-established and longstanding doctrine, little is understood
about the mechanics of such adjudicative policy-making. Thus, the
central role of the administrative judges to this crucial administrative
function remains largely unexamined, even by the judges
themselves. This Article isolates the role of administrative judges
in the development of administrative policy. It concludes that they
must have a substantial role if policy-making in administrative
adjudication is to perform the key task of administrative policymaking in general.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. makes it clear that agencies as well as the courts must obey6
congressional intent to the extent they can find it in the statute.
Administrative judges are just as responsible as the agencies for
compliance with this command. In doing so, they must follow the
lead of the agencies for reasons beyond authority, including
uniformity, accountability, and fairness.
Like the agency,
administrative judges may shift to policy-making only if
application of the statute in the individual case is impossible
without some policy-making. 7 Related to their role in policy4. While often affirmed, the leading cases are NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267 (1974) and NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351 (2000). See generally
KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Chenery II
established administrative discretion to choose between rulemaking or
adjudication. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947)
("The absence of a general rule or regulation governing management trading
during reorganization did not affect the Commission's duties in relation to the
particular proposal before it.").
5. This article focuses on the administrative judge's role in the larger
context discussed in Charles J. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative
Judiciary,56 ALA. L. REv. 693 (2005).
6. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. It is necessary to distinguish administrative policy-making from
statutory interpretation. This distinction is crucial to the authority of federal
courts and hence it has been well expressed in that context. The Supreme Court
recently observed: "[W]hile there are federal interests that occasionally justify
this Court's development of federal common-law, our normal role is to interpret
law created by others and 'not to prescribe what it shall be."' Danforth v.
Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1046 (2008) (quoting Am. Trucking Assns., Inc. v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
Field, for example, observed that "'federal common law' ... refer[s] to any rule
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making, an administrative judge may find occasion to question the
agency's interpretation and begin the process of reevaluation up
the adjudicative hierarchy. Nonetheless, the administrative policymaking function is categorically different from statutory
interpretation,
and the role of the administrative judge is also
8
different.
Administrative policy is fluid, and adjudication has a wellaccepted role to play in its development. 9 However, administrative
judges, like that of their judicial counterparts, must stay within the
limits of the adjudicative process. The notion of stability serves
the individual values of predictability and reliance.' 0 These

of federal law created by a court . . .when the substance of that rule is not
clearly suggested by federal enactments--constitutional or congressional."
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REv. 881, 890 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Merrill expressed the
necessary contrast between law making and interpretation. Thomas W. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1985)
('Federal common law' . . . means any federal rule of decision that is not
mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not that
rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional
or an unconventional sense.").
8. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 ("When a challenge to an agency
construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the
wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case,
federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest are not judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches."').
9. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in
Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 91
(1991) ("These sources of indeterminacy in dealing with precedents have the
effect of enabling the Justices to engage in conscientious disagreements over the
scope of precedents, to consider new or renewed arguments, and to contribute to
the evolution of constitutional doctrine.").
10. Predictability and stability are integral to assuring the rule of law.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1997). See Lon Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 357 (1978) ("[A]djudication
should be viewed as a form of social ordering, as a way in which the relations of
men to one another are governed and regulated. Even in the absence of any
formalized doctrine of stare decisis or res judicata, an adjudicative determination
will normally enter in some degree into the litigants' future relations and into the
future relations of other parties who see themselves as possible litigants before
the same tribunal.").
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considerations are no doubt important to a fair administrative
system. Citizens should be able to rely on a current understanding
of agency law and take action under some reliable prediction of
administrative reaction. Administration should seek consistency
over time and within a program."l On the other hand, each new
precedent potentially impacts policy options. Fortunately, stare
decisis is not the rule in administrative adjudications, so an agency
is permitted to change its policy. 12 Thus, adjudicative policymaking must balance stability and innovation.
The "agency," as an institution, is responsible for developing
and adjusting its policy. Administrative adjudicative systems, even
relatively informal ones, replicate the basic judicial hierarchy. The
norm is a hearing reviewed through at least one level of
administrative appeal, often to the agency itself. In the end, the
agency must adopt a policy position in order for that policy to have
weight, giving the administrative review authority, either the
agency head or its representative, has the power to speak for the
institution as a whole. Thus, the hierarchical system centralizes
11. The doctrine of precedent in general furthers both temporal stability and
equality:
This concern for equal treatment usually surfaces in discussions about
the temporal stability of legal rules, because stare decisis promotes the
equal treatment of individuals over time. But equal treatment in a
spatial sense seems an equally compelling goal .... [G]eographical
variation in otherwise uniform rules caused by divergent judicial
interpretations seems irrational and unfair.
Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REv. 817, 852 (1994). Geographic or intra-program variation
would seem particularly repugnant in most administrative schemes. See
generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 677, 735-36 (1989).
12. See Entergy Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 319 F.3d
536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir.
1998) ("An agency's interpretation of its own precedent is entitled to
deference .

. .

. ")); State of Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556-57

(5th Cir. 1989) ("An agency. . . is not bound by the shackles of stare decisis to
follow blindly the interpretations that it, or the courts of appeals, have adopted
in the past."). But see Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d
222, 229 (3d Cir. 2003) ("If an agency departs from its own precedent without a
reasoned explanation, the agency may be said to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously."); Ramaprakash v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 346 F.3d 1121, 1124
(D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[A]gency action is arbitrary and capricious if it departs from
agency precedent without explanation."); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Normally, an
agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating cases before it.").
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adjudicative policy-making authority in a superior review
authority.' 3 Yet, the interaction between the administrative judges
and the review authority determines the success of adjudicative
policy-making. The review stage serves the dual function of
holding the administrative judges responsible outside their hearing
room and allowing for open analysis of possible policy-making
initiatives. 14 The administrative judges, for their part, serve the
overall process by bringing policy alternatives to the agency's
attention and forcing the agency to justify aggregate objectives as
against practical reality and individual consequences.
In addition, administrative judges have the foundational role of
developing the policy-making record.
Policy confronted in
adjudication requires that the facts compiled in the hearing level
record be adequate to support policy determinations and the
justification for those decisions. The record provides the policy
analysis throughout the adjudicative machinery with the
information it needs. In the end, the administrative judges must
produce a record adequate for that purpose.
Fortunately, administrative law permits its adjudicators to be
active in the development of the record.' 5 It is one of the ways
administrative adjudication is superior to other forms, especially in
confronting policy issues. Administrative judges must ensure that
the record contains the necessary technical and other policy
oriented information, what administrative law defines as
"legislative facts."' 6 In addition, the administrative judge might
13. While administrative judges should share knowledge and experience in
handling individual cases, they should not feel in any way bound by their
colleagues' prior treatment of like cases.
14. "In very broad terms, if the head of the agency remains relatively free to
reverse the ALJ, the values of expertise and political accountability
predominate. If the head of the agency is bound to defer substantially to the
ALJ, the value of objectivity and its appearance are dominant." William R.
Anderson, Judicial Review of State Administrative Action: Designing the
Statutory Framework,44 ADMIN. L. REv. 523, 556 (1992).
15. See, e.g., Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) ("ALJs
have a duty to develop a full and fair record in social security cases.");
Yanopoulos v. Dept. of Navy, 796 F.2d 468, 471 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
16. "Legislative facts" are contrasted with "adjudicative facts," or the facts
necessary to resolve the relevant individual dispute. Kenneth Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 364, 402 (1942) ("When an agency wrestles with a question of law or
policy, it is acting legislatively .... [T]he facts which inform [the tribunal's]
legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts,"
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consider whether broader opinions beyond those provided by the
litigants are necessary for a full airing of the policy issue.
Administrative judges have considerable discretion to admit such a
range of evidence, but they also need independent authority to seek
additional information, particularly legislative facts or policyoriented comments from non-litigants. 17 While party control of the
record is sufficient for individual dispute resolution, the policymaking function of adjudication is greatly enhanced when an
administrative judge ensures an adequate policy-making record in
those limited cases where the judge determines that the agency
may need to develop its policy in deciding an individual dispute.
The agency is also the locus of the general policy-making
process: "rulemaking." Ostensibly, administrative judges are not
included in that process; yet, they have a role. It is wellestablished that agencies have broad authority to interpret their
own rules and policy pronouncements and even to engage in
justified deviation. 18 Since the agency has the authority to

whereas adjudicative facts are "facts concerning [the] immediate parties."). The
distinction is also important to the rules regarding judicial notice. FED. R. EvID.
201, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1930 (1975).
17. Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may seek legal
advice only. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(b) (2008). See also
JEFFREY SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHics 173 (2000) ("While judges may, under certain circumstances, obtain
expert advice concerning the law from disinterested legal experts, the exception
does not extend to experts in other areas."). The Model Code of Judicial
Conduct intentionally narrows access to "legal" experts, which, as discussed
below, might be valuable in making policy judgments if read generously.
Consultation with other types of experts is prohibited for members of the
judiciary, but administrative law might take a different view. Id. § 5.07.
18. The classic authority for this proposition is Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) ("Since this involves an interpretation of
an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative
construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt."),
but the most cited case is Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (dealing with
agency interpretations in general). The Supreme Court continually reaffirms
this longstanding approach. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 588 (2000) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled
to deference."); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144, 151 (1991) ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or
changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and
policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to
interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's delegated
lawmaking powers.").
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interpret its general policy pronouncements, its administrative
judges in the course of applying the policy statements will identify
instances in which interpretation is necessary. 19 Thus, as with
superior precedent, administrative judges might interpret rules so
as to move the agency's policy along.
Moreover, their
applications of general policy to individual disputes provide
perspective on the policy as applied so that the agency has
"samples" for evolving future policy.
Change should percolate up through the process, and judges'
interpretations provide experience upon which the rule and its
policy are to develop. Adjustments within the terms of the rule
neither challenge the agency's authority nor unduly upset stability
and equality. While judges must pay close attention to the
language and clear meaning, a potential policy-making
contribution, as with precedent, requires them to look behind the
rule to conclude that strict application of the terms of the rule
would not further its purpose in the case at hand. That is, rather
than literal strategies of interpretation, the judge may attempt to
apply the rule as the agency should interpret it in that context and
hence launch a policy inquiry throughout the administrative
hierarchy.
The melding of rules and other policy pronouncements into
individual adjudicative decisions raises complex questions about
the allocation of authority within the administrative structure. That
administrative rules have different force and may bind
administrative adjudicators in various ways might be seen as
complicating the division of authority. Rules made pursuant to
delegated authority to make policy--"legislative rules"-have the
force of law binding both the agency, including of course the

19. Interpretation may not constitute amendment or repeal. So even the
agency head may not amend or repeal in an adjudication, because a rule must be
amended or repealed by the same procedure with which it was promulgated.
KOCH, supra note 2, § 4.60[2]. If the need for amendment is identified in
adjudication or if the interpretation cannot make the necessary adjustment
without constituting an amendment, then the adjudicators must commend the
issue to the policy-making processes of the agency.
20. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) ("The APA
does not require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by further,
more precise rules rather than by adjudication .... ").
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administrative judges, and courts. However, the vast majority of
an agency's general policy is announced in other forms and under
various labels: generally "guidance documents." The practical
value of these guidance documents is to allow the agency to
efficiently and expeditiously disclose its policy thinking.2E While
guidance documents are said to have only "persuasive" effect, they
nonetheless generally bind the agency and hence all agency
adjudicators.
From a system perspective, comprehensive adherence assures
equal treatment. In terms of fairness, individuals should be able to
rely on these guidance documents.23 In short, administrative
judges have the dual role of applying general agency policy and
assuring individual fairness in its application. 24 Nonetheless, in
certain circumstances, this role may demand that the administrative
judges raise policy questions that the agency should confront.
In sum, administrative judges are no less than the cornerstone
of the administrative adjudicative aspect of policy-making.
Administrative judges serve the policy-making function as both
record builders and initial decision-makers. All other participants
in the adjudicative process, including the courts, work from this
initial policy analysis. The agency must develop policy that carries
forward the intent of the statute, and administrative judges should
21. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984) ("Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.");
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979); O'Sullivan v. Countrywide
Home Loan, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 741 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844 ("Where . . . agency regulations are promulgated under express
congressional authority, they are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.")).
22. E.g., Robert Anthony, InterpretiveRules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like--Should FederalAgencies Use them to Bind the Public?,
41 DuKE L. J. 1311, 1317 (1992) ("The use of nonlegislative policy documents
generally serves the important function of informing staff and the public about
agency positions, and in the great majority of instances is proper and indeed
very valuable."). Nonetheless, the Office of Management and Budget recently
published guidelines to encourage agencies to provide some participation for
guidance documents. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72
Fed. Reg. 3432-01 (Jan. 25, 2007).
23. Anthony, supranote 22, at 1323.
24. The Supreme Court has ruled that the agency should not apply such
policy where the result would be unfair. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 233-35
(1974).
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contribute to that policy development. This paper urges that they
embrace this role and think carefully about how they should
perform it.
The very theory of our government, however, counsels caution
and restraint. Administrative judges are one level further removed
from the democratic institutions than are the agencies they serve.
The regulatory and beneficial programs for which the
administrative state was created require delegations, and
practicality has supported very broad delegations. For example,
Justice Blackmun found in Mistretta v. United States: "Applying
this 'intelligible principle' test to congressional delegations, our
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in
our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent
25
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.
Democratic accountability is permissibly removed one level
through monitoring the implementing authority. Posner and
Vermeule observed:
Accountability is not lost through delegation, then; it is
transformed. Congress is accountable for the performance
of agencies generally, and people properly evaluate the
agencies' accomplishments as well as failures when
deciding whether to hold members responsible for
authorizing the agency, or for failing to curtail its power,
fix its mistakes, or eliminate it altogether.26
Administrative judges, however, are another level removed and
suffer from many of the same process impediments present in all
judicial policy-making. In the end, democracy demands that the
final policy judgments be made by the agency as intended by the
legislature and monitored by the courts. Argued here is that
administrative judges, nonetheless, should be important
participants in that process, but they must be no more than that.
The specter of personal prejudices also counsels hesitation.
Recognizing a policy-making role does not give administrative
judges license. As they leave the realm of individual dispute
25. 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
26. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Verneule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine,69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1749 (2002).
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resolution and join the policy-making process, they must carefully
consider the sources of their personal policy preferences. A good
deal of theoretical and behavioral work has been done on judicial
27
decision-making, and administrative judges should examine that.
Administrative judges must be conscious of their motivations and
assure that they are appropriate.28 Lynn Stout, however, offers
reason for optimism that should guide both the administrative
judges and the agencies who employ them: "Judges understand, at
an intuitive level, that the judicial role is premised on society's
expectation that judges, when they are judging, will adopt an otherregarding preference function rather than a self-interest preference
function; that they will29seek not to improve their own welfare but
to 'do the right thing.'

27. Of the numerous theoretical and empirical efforts to explain how judges
make policy choices, I find most useful Dworkin, supranote 2.
28. See Koch, supra note 5, at 720-26, for further explanation.
29. Lynn Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1605, 1625 (2002). For those of us who think about managing administrative
judges, she observes: "If the judiciary is indeed an institution built on the
expectation and experience of judicial altruism, even in its diluted form of
commitment to public service, understanding the determinants of altruistic
behavior may well be the key to encouraging good judging." Id. at 1619.

